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I
INTRODUCTION
In INS v. Chadha,1 the Supreme Court invoked a strained theory of
separation of powers to strike down Congress's use of a "legislative veto," a
device used for a half century to control the executive branch. Through the use
of the legislative veto, Congress delegated power to the executive branch on the
condition that Congress could control executive decisions without having to pass
another law. These legislative controls, short of a public law, included one-house
vetoes, two-house vetoes, and even committee vetoes. Congressional actions by
a legislative veto were not presented to the President for his signature or veto.
It may appear that this procedure thrust Congress unfairly (or even
unconstitutionally) into administrative decisions that should have been left to
executive officials; the initiative for the legislative veto came from President
Hoover, however, and executive officials tolerated the arrangement for decades
because it was in their interest. By attaching the safeguard of a legislative veto,
Congress was willing to delegate greater discretion and authority to the executive
branch. If Congress failed to invoke the legislative veto, the executive branch
could, in effect, "make law" without further congressional involvement. The
experiment with the legislative veto lasted for five decades before it was
invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1983.
In response to Chadha, Congress eliminated the legislative veto from a
number of statutes. The legislative veto continues to thrive, however, as a
practical accommodation between executive agencies and congressional
committees. More than two hundred new legislative vetoes have been enacted
since Chadha. In addition, legislative vetoes of an informal and nonstatutory
nature continue to define executive-legislative relations. The meaning of
constitutional law in this area is evidently determined more by pragmatic
agreements hammered out between the elected branches than by doctrines
announced by the Supreme Court.
The next part of this article explicates the Court's decision in Chadha. Part
III discusses the origins of the legislative veto and its traditional place in the
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lawmaking process. The current status and role of the legislative veto are
described in Part IV. The article concludes by explaining Chadha's negative
effects on lawmaking.
II
INS v. CHADHA
In what was widely touted as a landmark separation of powers decision, the
Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha declared that "legislative vetoes" were an
invalid form of congressional control. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Burger ruled that whenever congressional action has the "purpose and effect of
altering the legal rights, duties, and relations" of persons outside the legislative
branch, Congress must act through both houses in a bill presented to the
President.2 Congress had to comply, therefore, with two elements of the
Constitution: bicameralism (passage by both houses) and the Presentation
Clause (presenting a bill to the President for his signature or veto). All
legislative vetoes violated the latter principle because they were not presented
to the President. Some legislative vetoes also violated bicameralism because only
one house had to veto the congressional action. Under this decision, Congress
could no longer exercise control merely by passing "simple resolutions" (adopted
by either house), "concurrent resolutions" (passed by both houses but not sent
to the President), or even by committee actions.
Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, nevertheless found reason to be
concerned by the majority opinion. "The breadth of this holding," he said,
"gives one pause."3 The respect due the judgment of Congress as a "coordinate
branch of Government cautions that our holding should be no more extensive
than necessary to decide these cases."4 It was his view that the decision could
have been decided "on a narrower ground."5  Instead of invalidating all
legislative vetoes, ranging from rulemaking to war powers, Justice Powell would
invalidate the veto only in those cases in which Congress "assumed a judicial
function in violation of the principle of separation of powers.",
6
Chadha was such a case. The Immigration and Nationality Act authorized
the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of an individual. The statute
also permitted either house of Congress to disapprove the Attorney General's
decision. The Attorney General submitted a list of 340 suspensions and the
House of Representatives disapproved six of the names. Among the six was
Jagdish Rai Chadha, a foreign student who had remained in the United States
illegally after his visa expired. The legislative veto thus became an instrument
to rule on the legal rights of an individual. Although Justice Powell agreed with
2. Id. at 952.
3. Id. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 960.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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the Court's judgment as to Mr. Chadha's case, he said he would be "hesitant to
conclude that every veto is unconstitutional on the basis of the unusual example
presented by this litigation."7
Because of the broad grounds on which the Court based its ruling, all of the
statutory provisions authorizing legislative vetoes were rendered unconstitutional.
As Justice White noted in his dissent, the Court not only invalidated the one-
house veto in the immigration statute "but also sound[ed] the death knell for
nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative
veto.' '8 Justice White "regret[ted] the destructive scope" of the Court's ruling,
pointing out that the decision struck down in "one fell swoop" more laws
enacted by Congress than the Court had cumulatively invalidated in the entire
history of the Court.9
In one sense, Justice White overstated his case. He predicted that without
the legislative veto Congress would be
faced with a Hobson's choice: either to refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving
itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special
circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its lawmaking
function to the Executive Branch and independent agencies."
In fact, Congress and executive agencies have discovered other more acceptable
options: using the legislative veto precisely as before and converting legislative
vetoes into informal understandings that give committees effective control over
agency decisions.
What accounts for this gap between what the Court said and what the two
political branches continue to do? Why has there been so little compliance with
what all observers regard as an "epic" separation of powers decision? Did the
Court attempt too broad a remedy and fail to recognize the practical needs that
led Congress and the executive branch to adopt the legislative veto in the first
place? Evidently those needs were present before Chadha and continue to exist
after the Court's decision.
III
ORIGINS OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
Chadha is deficient in part because the Court never fully understood why
Congress and the executive branch decided to adopt the legislative veto. It is
superficial to think that the legislative veto merely represents an attempt by
Congress to encroach on executive responsibilities. The legislative veto
originated because presidents wanted it.11 Executive initiative, not legislative
7. Id. at 924 n.1.
8. Id. at 967.
9. Id. at 1002.
10. Id. at 968.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 23, 39, 40, 42, 44, and 66.
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usurpation, explains why the legislative veto took root and flourished. Presidents
asked Congress to delegate additional authority and were willing to accept the
legislative veto that controlled the delegation.
In addition, Congress did not need the Court to explain that the lawmaking
process requires bicameralism and presentment. That elementary fact is well
understood. At no time in the controversy of the legislative veto did anyone
argue that Congress can make a law by anything short of that process, such as
one chamber passing a simple resolution or both houses passing a concurrent
resolution, neither of which go to the President.
A. The Lawmaking Process
The making of a public law obviously requires action by both houses of
Congress and presentment of a bill to the President for his signature or veto.
The Constitution provides that "[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President."12
Bills and "joint resolutions" must comply with bicameralism and presentment
before becoming public laws. "Joint resolutions" and "bills" are identical. They
must pass both houses and be presented to the President.
From an early date, Congress passed simple resolutions and concurrent
resolutions for internal housekeeping matters. Since those resolutions did not
affect persons outside the legislative branch, they were not considered to be
"legislative in effect." Many were adopted pursuant to congressional powers
under Article I to determine procedural rules and to punish or expel mem-
bers.13 A Senate report in 1897 concluded that the meaning of "legislative in
effect" depended on substance, not form. If a simple resolution or concurrent
resolution contained matter that was "legislative in its character and effect," it
had to be presented to the President.14
On such issues there was no dispute. But what if a public law, enacted by
both Houses and signed by the President, authorized use of a simple or
concurrent resolution? Having been sanctioned by a public law enacted through
the regular legislative process, would the simple or concurrent resolution be
legally binding? Could such resolutions be used to control executive officials?
The binding nature of simple or concurrent resolutions was addressed in 1854
by Attorney General Cushing. The administration had rejected the claim of an
Isaac Bowman, who proceeded to apply to Congress for relief. The Senate
passed a resolution stating that his claim for half-pay due his father should be
referred to the Secretary of the Interior for liquidation. The House of
Representatives passed a similar resolution. Cushing summarized the issue:
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
13. Id. at art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.").
14. S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897).
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Whereupon the question of law submitted to me for consideration is, whether,
on the supposition that the Secretary, on a re-examination of the case, maintains
his original opinion, and believes the claim not to be allowable under the
provisions of the said act on the evidence presented, is he bound to consider
these two resolutions, or either of them, as mandatory on him, and as compelling
him to liquidate the claim against his judgment of the right of the case?
Cushing said it was "impossible" for him to conceive of anything other than
a negative answer to this question.16 Either by bill or joint resolution, Congress
could command a departmental official to perform a ministerial act, and the
official was bound in law to comply 7 Simple and concurrent resolutions had
no such binding effect. Cushing, however, made this careful distinction:
Of course, no separate resolution of either House can coerce a Head of
Department, unless in some particular in which a law, duly enacted, has
subjected him to the direct action of each; and in such case it is to be intended,
that, by approving the law, the President has consented to the exercise of such
coerciveness on the part of either House."
Apply this key point to Chadha and the question is now more complex than
suggested by the Supreme Court. The one-house veto allowing Congress to
disapprove suspensions by the Attorney General was placed in an immigration
bill and signed into law by the President, without any challenge to its constitu-
tionality. By approving the law, did the President "consent to the coerciveness"
of the one-house veto?
At the turn of the century, Congress used some simple and concurrent
resolutions to control the executive branch. Legislation in 1903 employed simple
resolutions to direct the Secretary of Commerce to make investigations and issue
reports. 9 In 1905, Congress relied on concurrent resolutions to direct the
Secretary of War to make investigations in rivers and harbors matters.20 House
precedents recognized the authority of a single house or both houses, through a
concurrent resolution, to direct these executive activities. 21
B. Presidential Initiatives
The concept of the legislative veto, as applied in the twentieth century, owes
its origin to President Herbert Hoover. Frustrated by an uncooperative
Congress, he wanted to make changes in legal structures without having to go
through the regular legislative process where his proposals might be ignored or
amended beyond recognition. He searched for innovative methods in the
15. 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 680, 681 (1854).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 681-82.
18. Id. at 683.
19. Act of Feb. 14, 1903, Pub. L. No. 87, § 8, 32 Stat. 825, 829 (1903).
20. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, Pub. L. No. 215, § 2, 33 Stat. 1117, 1147 (1905).
21. 2 ASHER C. HINDS, HIND'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 1593-1594 (1907).
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lawmaking process that would facilitate and expedite presidential action in
cutting federal spending and in increasing "economy and efficiency." Speaking
as Secretary of Commerce in 1924, Hoover had recommended that Congress give
the President authority, within specified limits, to reorganize executive
departments and agencies.Y
In his first annual message to Congress, in 1929, President Hoover suggested
that Congress could delegate reorganization powers to him, subject to some form
of congressional approval or disapproval. He said that he saw
no hope for the development of a sound reorganization of the Government unless
Congress [was] willing to delegate its authority over the problem (subject to defined
principles) to the Executive, who should act upon approval of a joint committee of
Congress or with the reservation of power of revision by Congress within some limited
period adequate for its consideration.'
In essence, the constitutional tables would be turned by allowing the President
to submit proposals subject to a congressional veto, instead of requiring Congress
to present a bill to the President for his approval or rejection.
President Hoover returned to the subject of executive reorganization in his
1931 annual message, although this time he did not specify a method of
congressional disapproval.' During the election year of 1932, he asked
Congress for authority to consolidate various executive and administrative
activities. He proposed that the President incorporate the reorganization changes
in an executive order, which would lie before Congress for sixty days during
which time Congress could "request suspension of action. '  The precise form
of congressional control was left unspecified.
Economy and efficiency in government became catchwords during the
presidential campaign in 1932. Both parties called for drastic reductions in
federal spending. The temper in Congress favored some grant of authority to the
President as a remedy for the delays associated with the legislative process.
Senator David Reed expressed his disillusionment with the system in place:
Mr. President, I do not often envy other countries their governments, but I say
that if this country ever needed a Mussolini it needs one now. I am not
proposing that we make Mr. Hoover our Mussolini, I am not proposing that we
should abdicate the authority that is in us, but if we are to get economies made
they have to be made by some one who has the power to make the order and
stand by it. Leave it to Congress and we will fiddle around here all summer
trying to satisfy every lobbyist, and we will get nowhere. The country does not
want that. The country wants stern action, and action taken quickly ....
22. JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcutrIvE DEPARTMENTS, HEARINGS
ON "REORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS," 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 353 (1924).
23. PUB. PAPERS, 1929, at 432.
24. Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, PUB. PAPERS, 1931, at 580-95.
25. The President's News Conference of February 16, 1932, PUB. PAPERS, 1932-33, at 53-58.
26. 75 CONG. REC. 9644 (1932).
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Hoover received reorganization authority in the form of an amendment (Part
II) to the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1933.' Title IV
of Part II, known as the Economy Act of 1932, authorized the President to
reorganize the executive branch, subject to a one-house legislative veto. The
procedure required the President to submit reorganization proposals in an
Executive Order, which would become effective within sixty days unless either
House disapproved by simple resolution. Congress could shorten the time period
by passing a concurrent resolution of approval:
SEC. 407. Whenever the President makes an Executive order under the
provisions of this title, such Executive order shall be transmitted to the Congress
while in session and shall not become effective until after the expiration of sixty
calendar days after such transmission, unless Congress shall sooner approve of
such Executive order or orders by concurrent resolution, in which case said order
or orders shall become effective as of the date of the adoption of the resolution
S... Provided further, That if either branch of Congress within such sixty
calendar days shall pass a resolution disapproving of such Executive order, or
any part thereof, such Executive order shall become null and void to the extent
of such disapproval.'
Hoover signed the bill on June 30, 1932. Even with the presence of a one-
house veto, the procedure clearly had benefits for the President. Instead of
requiring the President to secure the support of both houses for bills he wanted
passed, as would be necessary in the regular legislative process, the burden was
on Congress to prevent presidential plans from taking effect. Other expedited
features were attractive to the President: The executive orders to reorganize
could not be buried in committee, filibustered, or amended by Congress, either
in committee or on the floor.
Shortly after Hoover signed the bill, Congress adjourned. When it
reconvened on December 5, 1932, Hoover issued eleven executive orders
consolidating some fifty-eight governmental activities.2 9 By that time, however,
Hoover had been overwhelmingly defeated for reelection, and it was evident that
members of Congress, in the closing hours of a lame-duck session, intended to
leave reorganization changes to his successor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. On
January 19, 1933, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving
all of Hoover's reorganization proposals.'
Before leaving office, President Hoover raised a question about the
constitutionality of the legislative veto. On January 24, 1933, he vetoed a bill
that required the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation to approve any
refunds or credits in excess of $20,000. Hoover argued that it was unconstitu-
tional for Congress to undertake executive and administrative functions.3' To
27. Act of June 30, 1932, Pub. L. No. 212, 47 Stat. 382 (1932).
28. Id. §§ 401-408.
29. 76 CONG. REc. 233-54 (1932).
30. Id. at 2125-26.
31. Id. at 2445-46.
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his veto message, he attached an opinion by Attorney General William Mitchell,
who challenged not only the committee control over tax refunds but also the
one-house veto over executive reorganization proposals:
It must be assumed that the functions of the President under this act were
executive in their nature or they could not have been constitutionally conferred
upon him, and so there was set up a method by which one house of Congress
might disapprove Executive action. No one would question the power of
Congress to provide for delay in the execution of such an administrative order,
or its power to withdraw the authority to make the order, provided the
withdrawal takes the form of legislation. The attempt to give either House of
Congress, by action which is not legislation, power to disapprove administrative
acts, raises a grave question as to the validity of the entire provision in the Act
of June 30, 1932, for Executive reorganization of governmental functions.32
On the vote to override Hoover's veto, Congressman Heartsill Ragon asked
why the President should object to the provision that gave Congress the right to
investigate refund amounts that exceeded $20,000: "We have the right, or have
been assuming the right, to examine all amounts above $75,000. Has anyone
ever objected to the constitutionality of the act that gave us that authority? 33
At what point on the continuum between $75,000 and $20,000 did the constitu-
tional violation emerge? The joint committee presently conducts a review (in
effect a veto) of tax refunds in excess of $200,000.34
One day before Roosevelt's inauguration, Congress extended the President's
reorganization authority for two years but eliminated the one-house veto.35
Roosevelt could exercise the authority without the check of a legislative veto.
Senator James F. Byrnes offered the amendment to delete the legislative veto
after reaching the conclusion that Attorney General Mitchell was "probably
correct."
36
President Roosevelt was not particularly interested in executive branch
reorganization, as the process was understood at that time. He did not consider
reorganization as a means of achieving "economy," notwithstanding campaign
rhetoric to that effect, but rather as a means to increase the President's
managerial power. To Roosevelt, the true purpose of reorganization was
"improved management, which would make administration more responsive to
the national interest and better able to serve that interest.
37
In 1937, Roosevelt asked Congress to renew the authority to reorganize the
executive branch, subject, however, to a joint resolution of disapproval (to satisfy
both bicameralism and presentment). He advised Congress the next year that
any action short of a bill or joint resolution, such as by simple resolution or
concurrent resolution, would merely represent "an expression of congressional
32. 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 63-64 (1933).
33. 76 CONG. REc. 2448 (1933).
34. 26 U.S.C. § 6405(a) (1988).
35. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, Pub. L. No. 428, §§ 401-409, 47 Stat. 1489, 1517-20 (1933).
36. 76 Stat. 3538 (1933).
37. RICHARD POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT's GOVERNMENT 7 (1966).
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sentiment" and could not "repeal Executive action taken in pursuance of a
law.",38 Consequently, one-house or two-house legislative vetoes would have no
binding effect on the President.
The Senate passed legislation acceding to his request, but the House of
Representatives balked. Members of the House did not want to oppose a
reorganization plan by joint resolution, have it vetoed by the President, and then
scramble for the necessary two-thirds in each House for an override. In effect,
they would delegate authority by majority vote but could recapture it only with
an extraordinary majority.
Within a matter of days, after realizing that his bill was dead in the House
of Representatives, Roosevelt reversed course and supported an amendment to
allow Congress to reject reorganization plans by a concurrent resolution. A
number of ingenious arguments were conceived to justify Roosevelt's switch.
First, the President would be acting as an "agent" of Congress, subject to the
conditions established by the legislative branch. The legislative veto would thus
be the vehicle by which Congress would announce that the President had
violated or misused his power of agency. Second, administrative supporters
distinguished between the use of a concurrent resolution applied to past laws
(which would have been unconstitutional) and those applied to laws "in the
making" (constitutionally acceptable).39
The reorganization bill enacted in 1939 included the two-house veto. In
signing the bill, Roosevelt expressed no constitutional objections. Whatever
constitutional misgivings presidents may have harbored about the legislative veto,
they acquiesced because Congress insisted that it would delegate certain
authorities only by attaching effective conditions of legislative control. Presidents
who wanted additional statutory authority had to take the strings attached to it.
For example, President Roosevelt signed the Lend Lease Act of 1941, which
permitted Congress to terminate the President's emergency authority by
concurrent resolution. Roosevelt had strong reservations about the constitution-
ality of this procedure, but withheld them from the public and Congress. In a
memorandum to Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, asking that a statement
be prepared detailing his constitutional position, Roosevelt explained that "the
emergency was so great that I signed the bill in spite of a clearly unconstitutional
provision contained in it."'  The memorandum requested by Roosevelt was
prepared and left in Jackson's hands to publish at some future date.41 When
it was published in 1953, Jackson claimed that Roosevelt's reasons for not
publishing those views in 1941 were political. Roosevelt's views coincided with
those of the opponents of the Lend Lease Bill. His supporters had argued that
the concurrent resolution provision was valid. For Roosevelt to make his views
known at that time, Jackson said it "would confirm and delight his opposition
38. 83 CONG. REC. 4487 (1938).
39. Id. at 5004-05.
40. Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1353, 1354 (1953).
41. Id.
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and let down his friends. It might seriously alienate some of his congressional
support at a time when he would need to call on it frequently. It would also
strengthen fear in the country that he was seeking to increase his personal
power. ' 42
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower also signed reorganization bills that
contained the legislative veto. When the authority was extended in 1949,
Congress tightened its control by substituting a one-house veto for the
concurrent resolution of disapproval. In the meantime, the legislative veto began
to proliferate, again at the urging of the executive branch. Legislation in 1940
authorized the Attorney General to suspend deportation of an alien, subject to
a two-house veto (later changed to a one-house veto).4 a Under the previous
system, relief was available only if Congress passed a private bill for the
individual. The administration successfully argued that passage of private bills
created a hardship on aliens and that it would be better to delegate discretionary
authority to executive officials, subject to a legislative veto.'
During the emergency conditions of World War II, it was impracticable for
Congress to authorize each defense installation or public works project.
Beginning with an informal system in 1942, all proposals for acquisitions of land
and leases were submitted to the Naval Affairs Committees for their approval.45
That understanding was formalized in public laws enacted in 1944.6 For such
projects, the Secretary of the Navy had to "come into agreement" with the Naval
Affairs Committees.' Congress enacted similar arrangements in 1949.4
When executive officials objected to congressional committee involvement in
administrative decisions, Congress could always eliminate discretionary authority
for the officials and force them to obtain advance congressional approval. Thus,
statutory language in 1951 prohibited the military departments from granting or
transferring any land or buildings unless Congress first authorized the depart-
mental action through the regular legislative process.4 9  President Truman
objected to the restriction, pointing out that it would cause unwarranted delays,
and urged Congress to repeal it.0 Congress repealed the offending language,
but inserted a requirement that the military departments and the Federal Civil
Defense Administration ("FCDA") would have to come into agreement with the
42. Id. at 1356-57.
43. Act of June 28, 1940, Pub. L. No. 670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
44. Harvey C. Mansfield, The Legislative Veto and the Deportation of Aliens, 1 PUB. ADM. REV.
281 (1941).
45. Virginia A. McMurtry, Legislative Vetoes Relating to Public Works and Buildings, in STUDIES
ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO, PREPARED FOR THE HOUSE COMMrrTEE ON RULES, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
432-514 (1980).
46. Act of Jan. 28, 1944, Pub. L. No. 244, 58 Stat. 7 (1944); Act of Apr. 4, 1944, Pub. L. No. 289,
58 Stat. 189 (1944).
47. 58 Stat. 190 (1944).
48. Act of May 11, 1949, Pub. L. No. 60, § 2, 63 Stat. 66 (1949).
49. Act of Jan. 6, 1951, Pub. L. No. 910, § 407, 64 Stat. 1221, 1223 (1951).
50. Special Message to the Congress on the Transfer or Sale of Surplus Military Property, Public
PUB. PAPERS, 1951, at 106-07.
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Armed Services Committees before acting on certain real estate transactions.
Truman vetoed the bill largely on policy grounds, but added: "Under our system
of Government it is contemplated that the Congress will enact the laws and will
leave their administration and execution to the executive branch."51 Yet at the
end of the year he signed a bill that required the military departments and the
FCDA to come into agreement with the Armed Services Committees before
proceeding with the disputed real estate actions.52 In 1952, in another veto
message, Truman objected to the committee-veto power that Congress attempted
to give to the Post Office committees: "I do question the propriety and wisdom
of giving Committees veto power over executive functions authorized by
Congress to be carried out by executive agencies."53
In 1954, President Eisenhower vetoed a bill that required the Secretary of the
Army to come into agreement with the Armed Services Committees concerning
the disposal of land in Florida. Eisenhower was explicit in identifying the
constitutional problem: "[Tihe bill would violate the fundamental constitutional
principle of separation of powers prescribed in Articles I and II of the
Constitution which place the legislative power in the Congress and the executive
power in the Executive Branch."' Congress enacted new legislation that
omitted the coming-into-agreement provision.5
The interbranch struggle continued in 1955 when Congress added to the
defense appropriation bill a section that allowed either of the Appropriations
Committees to disapprove the disposal or transfer by contract of work that had
previously been done by civilian employees of the Defense Department.' To
stem the tide of these committee vetoes, Attorney General Brownell prepared
an opinion that dismissed this form of legislative control as an unconstitutional
infringement on executive duties:
The practical effect of these provisions is to vest the power to administer the
particular program jointly in the Secretary of Defense and the members of the
Appropriations Committees, with the overriding right to forbid action reserved
to the two Committees. This, I believe, engrafts executive functions upon
legislative members and thus overreaches the permitted sweep of legislative
authorit. At the same time, it serves to usurp power confided to the executive
branch.
51. Veto of Bill Reciting to Land Acquisition and Disposal Actions by the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Federal Civil Defense Administration (May 15, 1951), PUB. PAPERS, 1951, at 282.
52. Act of Sept. 28, 1951, Pub. L. No. 155, § 601, 65 Stat. 336, 365 (1951).
53. Memorandum of Disapproval of Bill Authorizing the Postmaster General to Lease Quarters for
Post Office Purposes, July 19, 1952, PUB. PAPERS, 1952-53, at 488.
54. Veto of Bill Providing for the Conveyance of Lands Within Camp Blanding Military
Reservation, Florida, May 25, 1954, PuB. PAPERS, 1954, at 508.
55. Act of July 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 493, 68 Stat. 474 (1954).
56. Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1956, Pub. L. No. 157, § 638, 69 Stat. 301, 321
(1955).
57. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 230, 231 (1955).
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President Eisenhower signed the defense appropriation bill with its provision
for committee veto, but, drawing on the Brownell opinion, indicated that the
latter provision would be regarded as invalid by the executive branch." By
approving the bill, he did not acquiesce in the provision for a legislative veto:
"once an appropriation is made the appropriation must, under the Constitution,
be administered by the executive branch of the Government alone .. . ." On
several other occasions, Eisenhower indicated that he would not accept
provisions for committee control of administrative decisions.'
The Eisenhower Administration soon learned that if it closed the door to one
type of committee control Congress could invent others that passed constitutional
muster. Legislation was soon drafted to prohibit appropriations for certain real
estate transactions unless the Public Works Committees first approved the
contracts. 61 The "committee veto" thus operated within the halls of Congress
rather than against executive agencies. Eisenhower signed the bill after Brownell
assured him that this new procedure was constitutional because it was based on
the power of Congress to control its authorization and appropriation procedures.
The committee veto was directed internally against another committee instead
of externally against the executive branch. The form had changed; the
committee veto remained.62 In 1972, President Nixon also acknowledged that
this type of internal committee veto posed no constitutional problem. 63 These
provisions remain in current law.'
IV
THE ACCOMMODATION COLLAPSES (ALMOST)
Interbranch relations experienced serious conflicts in the 1970s when
Congress added the legislative veto to statutes covering such diverse subjects as
the war power, national emergencies, impoundment, presidential papers, federal
salaries, and agency regulations. By the late 1970s, when public opposition to
federal controls over the private sector intensified, Congress threatened to extend
the legislative veto so that it covered every regulation issued by federal
agencies.65
The Carter Administration challenged the constitutionality of legislative
vetoes, but made a few exceptions. An opinion by Attorney General Griffin Bell
58. PUB. PAPERS, 1955, at 688-689.
59. Id. at 689.
60. Veto of Bill Authorizing Certain Construction of Military Installations (July 15, 1956), PuB.
PAPERS, 1956, at 596-59; Statement by the President Upon Signing the Small Reclamation Projects Act
of 1956, PUB. PAPERS, 1956, at 648-50.
61. Act of September 9, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-249, § 7(a), 73 Stat. 480 (1959).
62. JOSEPH P. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 230-31 (1964).
63. Statement About Signing the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, PUB. PAPERS, 1972,
at 627.
64. E.g., 38 U.S.C. § 5004(a) (1988); 40 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1988).
65. Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 142-43
(1991).
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in 1977 attempted to justify the one-house veto in the reorganization statutes; the
administration wanted to keep reorganization authority, but cast doubt on other
forms of the legislative veto.66
The following year, President Carter released a major critique of the
legislative veto. He now took the position that all legislative vetoes were
unconstitutional and would be treated merely as "report-and-wait" provisions.67
The administration would report to Congress on pending actions, wait a specified
number of days, take into consideration the congressional response, and then act
in the way the administration decided was best. It would not regard any
committee veto, simple resolution, or concurrent resolution as legally binding.
On the very day that Carter issued his statement denouncing legislative
vetoes, two officials from his administration appeared at a press conference to
explain the administration's policy. Reporters wanted to know how Carter's
unyielding position applied to the procedure governing arms sales, which
Congress, under law, could veto by concurrent resolution. Attorney General Bell
was asked whether President Carter would feel bound if Congress, by a two-
house veto, disapproved the pending Mideast arms sales package. Bell replied:
He would not be bound in our view, but we have to have comity between the
branches of government, just as we have between nations. And under a spirit
of comity, we could abide by it, and there would be nothing wrong with abiding
by it. We don't have to have a confrontation every time we can.
White House adviser Stuart Eizenstat added:
I think the point the Judge is making is that we don't concede the constitutional-
ity of any of [the legislative vetoes] yet, but that as a matter of comity with
certain of these issues where we think the Congress has a legitimate interest,
such as the War Powers Act, as a matter of comity, we are willing to forego the
specific legal challenge and abide by that judgment because we think it is such
an overriding issue.
68
Although the Carter Administration made a few accommodations with
Congress, it was also willing to support a legal challenge to the legislative veto.
The challenge ultimately resulted in the 1983 Supreme Court decision INS v.
Chadha, which struck down the legislative veto in all its forms. By the time the
case reached the Court, briefs in opposition to the legislative veto were filed by
the Reagan Administration, the American Bar Association, and the attorneys for
Chadha. The Senate and the House of Representatives filed briefs that defended
the constitutionality of the legislative veto.
66. Reorganization Act--Constitutionality of Provision Permitting Disapproval of Reorganization
Plan by Resolution of a Single House of Congress, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 10 (1977).
67. Legislative Vetoes: Message to the Congress, PUB. PAPERS, 1978, at 1146-49.
68. Office of the White House Secretary, Briefing by Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy, and John Harmon, Office of Legal
Counsel, June 21, 1978, at 4.
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A. Congressional Compliance with Chadha
Following the Court's ruling in 1983, Congress amended a number of statutes
by deleting legislative vetoes and replacing them with joint resolutions. Congress
replaced the one-house veto in the executive reorganization statute with a joint
resolution of approval.69 Although this satisfied the twin requirements of
Chadha (bicameralism and presentment), the President's position was actually
worsened. The President now had to obtain the approval of both houses within
a specified number of days in order to reorganize executive agencies. Under the
procedure that operated before Chadha, a reorganization plan automatically
became effective within a fixed number of days unless one house acted to
disapprove. The shift to a joint resolution of approval meant that Congress had,
in effect, a negative one-house veto. The refusal of one House to support a joint
resolution of approval would spell defeat for a reorganization proposal. The new
procedure was so onerous that the Reagan Administration decided not to request
a renewal of reorganization authority after it expired.
Congress also replaced several legislative vetoes in the District of Columbia
Home Rule Act with a joint resolution of disapproval.7" This form of action
puts the burden on Congress to stop a District of Columbia initiative. The
Chadha decision had cast a legal cloud over the city's authority to issue tax-
exempt bonds and to take certain actions involving criminal law.
Three statutes in 1985 removed legislative vetoes from statutory procedures.
The concurrent resolution governing national emergencies was replaced by a
joint resolution of disapproval.71 The same approach was used on legislation
concerning export administration.' A number of legislative vetoes had been
used in the past to deal with federal pay increases. Congress eliminated those
legislative vetoes and again relied on a joint resolution of disapproval.73
After Chadha, some members of Congress introduced legislation to change
the War Powers Act, which contains a provision that allows Congress to pass a
concurrent resolution to order the President to withdraw troops engaged in
combat. It was suggested that the concurrent resolution be replaced by a joint
resolution of disapproval.74 As finally enacted, however, the procedure for a
joint resolution was not added to the War Powers Act. Instead, it is a separate
and alternative legislative procedure that is available to force a vote to order the
withdrawal of troops.75
69. Act of Nov. 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, 98 Stat. 3192 (1984).
70. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, § 131, 98 Stat. 1945, 1974 (1984).
71. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 801, 99
Stat. 405, 448 (1985).
72. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 301(b), 99 Stat. 120, 160
(1985).
73. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-190, §
135(e), 99 Stat. 1322 (1985).
74. 129 CONG. REC. 28,406-08, 28,673-74, 28,683-84, 28,686-89 (1983).
75. 129 CONG. REc. 33,395-96 (1983); 97 Stat. 1062, § 1013 (1983). See 50 U.S.C. § 1546a (1988).
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It can be argued that the concurrent resolution in the War Powers Act is
technically not a legislative veto covered by Chadha. If we define legislative veto
as a condition placed on delegated authority (such as the authority delegated in
reorganization statutes), nothing is delegated in the War Powers Resolution.
Congress did not claim that the war power was purely a legislative prerogative
and that it was delegating a portion to the President with the understanding that
it could control the delegated power by exercising a two-house veto. In that
sense, Chadha has no application to the War Powers Act.76
Legislation in 1974 gave Congress a one-house veto to disapprove presiden-
tial proposals to defer the spending of appropriated funds.' Even before
Chadha, Congress began to disapprove deferrals by inserting language in bills
passed through the regular legislative process, and then continued to do that
after the Chadha decision was announced. In 1986, however, when the Reagan
Administration turned to deferrals to make the deficit targets in the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings legislation, affected parties went to court to contest the legality
of presidential deferrals. They argued that if the one-house veto was invalid
under Chadha, the President's deferral authority was inextricably tied to the
unconstitutional legislative veto. According to the argument of plaintiffs,
Congress would not have delegated the deferral authority to the President unless
it knew it had a one-house veto to maintain control. If one part of the statute
fell, so did the other. The federal courts accepted that argument, holding that
the deferral authority and the one-house veto were inseverable. s Congress
promptly converted the judicial doctrine into statutory law.79 The effect was to
limit the President to routine, managerial deferrals and prohibit the use of
deferral authority to delay the spending of funds simply because the President
disagrees with the budget priorities enacted into law.
In some cases legislative vetoes remained in the law but were never used
after Chadha. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 included
a two-house veto over certain agreements for cooperation,' ° and that procedure
continues to remain part of the law.81 However, Congress does not attempt to
use concurrent resolutions to control presidential initiatives in the area of non-
proliferation.'
76. Louis Fisher, War Powers: The Need for Collective Judgment, in DIVIDED DEMOCRACY:
COOPERATION AND CONFLICr BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 213-15 (J. Thurber ed., 1991).
77. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013(b),
88 Stat. 297, 335 (1974).
78. City of New Haven, Conn. v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987); City of New Haven,
Conn. v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986).
79. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
119, § 206, 101 Stat. 754, 785 (1987).
80. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, § 308, 92 Stat. 120, 139-41 (1978).
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2159(b)-(f) (1988).
82. Cranston v. Reagan, 611 F. Supp. 247, 251 (D.D.C. 1085).
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B. Legislative Vetoes After Chadha
Notwithstanding the mandate in Chadha, Congress continued to add
legislative vetoes to bills and Presidents Reagan and Bush continued to sign them
into law. From the date of the Court's decision in Chadha to the end of the
102nd Congress on October 8, 1992, Congress enacted more than two hundred
new legislative vetoes. Most of these require the executive branch to obtain the
approval of specified committees. Several committee vetoes appear in the
Treasury-Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act for fiscal
1992.83
When signing this bill into law, President Bush said that the provisions
''constitute legislative vetoes similar to those declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha. Accordingly, I will treat them as having no
legal force or effect in this or any other legislation in which they appear. '
Although the President may treat committee vetoes as having no legal force or
effect, agencies have a different attitude. They have to live with their review
committees, year after year, and have a much greater incentive to make
accommodations and stick by them.' Presidents and their legal advisers can
indulge in confrontations with Congress on these issues. Agencies cannot risk
these types of collisions with the committees that authorize their programs and
provide funds. The need for practical compromise is illustrated by the following
section, which demonstrates that even if Congress somehow eliminated all
legislative vetoes from statutes, the reality of committee vetoes would persist.
C. Informal and Nonstatutory Legislative Vetoes
The effect of Chadha was to drive some of the committee vetoes under-
ground, where they operate on the basis of informal and nonstatutory under-
standings. This dynamic became obvious in a conflict that arose in 1984, when
President Reagan signed an appropriations bill for the Department of Housing
and Urban Development and independent agencies. He objected to the presence
of seven provisions that required executive agencies to seek the prior approval
83. Pub. L. No. 102-141, 105 Stat. 834 (1991). The Internal Revenue Service may not transfer funds
in excess of 4 percent of an appropriation without the advance approval of the Appropriations
Committees (id. at 840); any transfers of funds by the Treasury Department must be approved in
advance by the Appropriations Committees (id. at 842, § 105); certain reprogrammings by the General
Services Administration are subject to the approval of the Appropriations Committees (id. at 850); the
funds may be obligated only upon the advance approval of the House Committee on Public Works and
Transportation and the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (id.); transfers of funds
for the Federal Buildings Fund must be submitted promptly to the Appropriations Committees for
approval (id. at 856, § 6); and executive officials appointed by the President may not spend more than
$5,000 to redecorate their offices unless expressly approved by the Appropriations Committees (id. at
871, § 618).
84. 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1525 (Oct. 28, 1991). See also his warnings to Congress at 25
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1853 (Nov. 30, 1989); 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1947 (Dec. 13, 1989);
26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1765 (Nov. 5,1990); 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1769 (Nov. 5,1990);
27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1525 (Oct. 28, 1991); 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1865 (Oct. 5, 1992);
28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1874 (Oct. 6, 1992).
85. E.g., LouIs FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 76-77 (1993).
[Vol. 56: No. 4
THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
of the Appropriations Committees.' In stating that he would implement
legislation "in a manner consistent with the Chadha decision," s he implied that
committee-veto provisions would be regarded by the administration as having no
legal effect. After notifying the committees, agencies could do as they liked
without obtaining the committees' approval.
The House Appropriations Committee lost little time in responding to this
presidential challenge. It reviewed a procedure that had worked well with the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA") for about four years.
Statutory ceilings ("caps") were placed on various NASA programs, usually at
the level requested in the President's budget. NASA could exceed those caps
only if it received permission from the Appropriations Committees. Because the
administration now threatened to ignore the committee controls, the House
Appropriations Committee said that it would repeal both the committee veto and
NASA's authority to exceed the caps.' If NASA wanted to spend more than
the caps allowed, it would have to do what the Court mandated in Chadha: pass
a bill through both Houses and present it to the President.
NASA did not want to obtain a new public law every time it needed to
exceed spending caps. To avoid that kind of administrative rigidity, NASA
Administrator James M. Beggs wrote to the Appropriations Committees and
suggested a compromise. Instead of putting the caps in a public law, he
recommended that they be placed in the conference report that explains how
Congress expects a public law to be carried out. He then pledged that NASA
would not exceed any ceiling identified in the conference report without first
obtaining the prior approval of the Appropriations Committees:
Without some procedure adjustment, other than a subsequent separate legislative
enactment, these ceilings could seriously impact the ability of NASA to meet
unforeseen technical changes or problems that are inherent in challenging R&D
programs. We believe that the present legislative procedure could be converted
by this letter into an informal agreement by NASA not to exceed amounts for
Committee designated programs without the approval of the Committees on
Appropriations. This agreement would assume that both the statutory funding
ceilings and the Committee approval mechanisms would be deleted from the FY
1985 legislation, and that it would not be the normal practice to include either
mechanism in future appropriations bills. Further, the agreement would assume
that the future program ceiling amounts would be identified by the Committees
in the Conference Report accompanying NASA's annual appropriations act and
confirmed by NASA in its submission of the annual operating plan. NASA
would not expend any funds over the ceilings identified in the Conference
Report for these programs without the prior approval of the Committees.'
86. Statement on Signing the Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1985 (July 18, 1984), PUB. PAPERS, 1984 (II), at 1056.
87. Id. at 1057.
88. H. REP. No. 916, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1984).
89. Letter from James M. Beggs, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, to Congressman Edward P. Boland, Chairman of the Subcommittee on HUD-
Independent Agencies of the House Committee on Appropriations, August 9, 1984 (on file with Law
& Contemporary Problems).
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NASA continues to abide by this agreement, which is permissible under
Chadha.' While not legally bound by this letter, NASA knows that violations
of trust would provoke the Appropriations Committees to reinsert caps in the
public law and compel the agency to seek a separate law each time it needs to
exceed the spending ceilings. Through such muscle, faith is inspired.
Another example of informal legislative vetoes came in 1987 when the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, James C. Miller III, objected
to a statutory provision that required the administration to obtain "written prior
approval" from the Appropriations Committees before transferring foreign
assistance funds from one account to another. The provision, he claimed,
violated Chadha.91 The House Appropriations Committee gave a familiar reply:
it would repeal the legislative veto and, at the same time, repeal the
administration's authority to transfer foreign assistance funds. Congressman
David R. Obey, Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee handling foreign
assistance, remarked: "To me, that [OMB letter] means we don't have an
accommodation any more, so the hell with it, spend the money like we
appropriated it. It's just dumb on their part.' 92
Rather than jeopardize valuable flexibility in the administration of foreign
assistance, OMB backed away from the confrontation. The regular legislative
language, including the committee veto, was enacted into law.' But when
Miller repeated the challenge the next year, Congress followed through on its
threat and deleted both the committee veto and the transfer authority.
The two branches reached a novel compromise in 1989. Congress removed
the legislative veto from the public law, but required the administration to follow
"the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations"
before transferring funds.' While not articulated in the public law, those
procedures require the administration to notify the Committees of each transfer.
If no objection is raised during a fifteen-day review period, the administration
may exercise the authority. If the Committees object, the administration could
proceed only at great peril. By ignoring committee objections, the executive
branch would most likely lose transfer authority the next year.
Informal, nonstatutory committee controls are used frequently to monitor
agency spending. For decades, congressional committees have insisted on
approving agency "reprogramming" (shifting funds from one program to another
within the same appropriations account). In return for the discretion to
reprogram funds, agencies are expected to notify congressional committees and
90. See 139 CONG. REc. H7371 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1993).
91. Edward Walsh, OMB Objection Raises House Panel's Hackles, WASH. POST, August 13, 1987,
at A13.
92. Id.
93. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-202, § 514, 101 Stat. 1329-131, 1329-155 (1987).
94. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-167, § 514, 103 Stat. 1195, 1219 (1989).
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in some cases obtain committee approval. These understandings were first
spelled out in committee reports, as part of the legislative history of a bill, and
later incorporated in agency budget manuals." Despite Chadha, this type of
legislative veto continues to be honored by executive agencies. For example, the
Department of Defense Budget Guidance Manual for May 1990 explains which
reprogramming actions require prior congressional approval.' Even if Congress
entirely removed legislative vetoes from statutes, their equivalent would be
embedded in agency manuals.
A final example of an informal agreement that permits committee control
involves the "Baker Accord" of 1989. In the early months of the Bush
Administration, Secretary of State James A. Baker III decided to give four
committees of Congress a veto power over the fractious issue of funding the
Nicaraguan Contras. In return for receiving $50 million in humanitarian aid for
the Contras, Baker agreed that a portion of the funds could be released only
with the approval of certain committees and party leaders.' White House
Counsel C. Boyden Gray objected to this level of involvement by Congress in
foreign policy, especially through what appeared to be an unconstitutional
legislative veto.9' Robert H. Bork regarded the Baker Accord as "even more
objectionable" than the legislative veto struck down in Chadha, because it
permitted control by mere committees instead of a one-house veto.99
However, the informal nature of the Baker Accord is not prohibited by
Chadha, and Baker agreed to the compromise. In a letter to Congress, he
agreed that the Contras would not receive financial assistance after November
30, 1989, unless he received letters from "the Bipartisan Leadership of Congress
and the relevant House and Senate authorization and appropriations commit-
tees."' 1 Four members of Congress sued the President and the Secretary of
State for entering into this "side agreement" with Congress, claiming that it
represented a forbidden legislative veto. A federal district court dismissed the
suit on the grounds that the plaintiffs had no standing and that the case
constituted a question of national defense and foreign policy committed to the
elected branches. 01
95. Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 75-98 (1975).
96. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, BUDGET GUIDANCE MANUAL (DOD 7110-1-M), May 1990, at 431-
6 (§ 431.4A.1), 431-11 (para. 3).
97. John Felton, Bush, Hill Agree to Provide Contras With New Aid, CONG. Q. WKLY REP., March
25 1989, at 656.
98. David Hoffman & Ann Devroy, Bush Counsel Contests Contra Air Plan, WASH. POST, March
26, 1989, at AS.
99. 135 CONG. REc. S3885 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989).
100. Letter from Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, to Speaker Jim Wright, April 28, 1989 (on
file with Law & Contemporary Problems).
101. Burton v. Baker, 723 F. Supp. 1550 (D.D.C. 1989).
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V
CONCLUSION
To lessen the chance of a self-inflicted wound, the Supreme Court usually
abides by the prudential course not to "formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."1"
The Court ignored that fundamental guideline in Chadha by issuing a decision
that not only reached beyond the immigration statute but exceeded the Court's
understanding of executive-legislative relations. Through an endless variety of
formal and informal agreements, congressional committees will continue to
exercise control over administration decisions.
The Court applied a simplistic solution to a complex issue. In doing so, it
suggested that the government follow a conventional lawmaking process that
excludes Congress from the administration of problems. That type of govern-
ment does not, and cannot, exist. By misreading the history of legislative vetoes
and failing to comprehend the subtleties of the legislative process, the Court
directed the executive and legislative branches to adhere to procedures that
would be impracticable and unworkable. Neither Congress nor the executive
branch wanted the static model of government offered by the Court.
The predictable and inevitable result of Chadha is a system of lawmaking
that is now more convoluted, cumbersome, and covert than before. Finding the
Court's doctrine incompatible with effective government, the elected branches
have searched for techniques that revive the understandings in place before 1983.
In many cases, the Court's decision simply drives underground a set of legislative
and committee vetoes that formerly operated in plain sight. In one form or
another, legislative vetoes will remain an important mechanism for reconciling
legislative and executive interests. The executive branch wants to retain access
to discretionary authority; Congress wants to control some of those discretionary
decisions without having to pass another public law. Such accommodations are
better fashioned by committees and agency officials than by judicial decisions,
especially the broadly crafted rules announced in Chadha.
102. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (citing Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co.
v. Emigration Comm'r, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
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